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Abstract: The purpose of this article is to examine the fiscal flows produced by the ac-
tions of the Spanish central public sector concerned with Catalonia and their main determi-
nants. We also compare the Catalan fiscal balance with that of rich territories in other coun-
tries (Australia, Belgium, Canada, the USA, Spain and Italy). To this aim the article exam-
ines, first, whether the methodology used in Catalonia meets international standards; second, 
whether the Catalan fiscal deficit is indeed among the largest in a sample of territories anal-
ysed; third, which are its main determinants. The methodology for calculating fiscal balances 
is found to be fairly standardised internationally, revealing that Catalonia has a structural fiscal 
deficit of between 6 and 8 percent of GDP, according to whether the benefit or the flow ap-
proach is applied. These figures are a consequence, to a large extent, of the Spanish system 
of financing the Autonomous Communities. Finally, we briefly discuss whether the fiscal 
flows can justify, at least partially, the current secessionist process of Catalonia. 
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1. Introduction
The actions of the central public administration produce fiscal flows 
between regions, inasmuch as taxes and public expenditure are distributed 
territorially applying different sets of criteria. The difference between the 
benefits that a population in a region receives in terms of central public ex-
penditure and its fiscal contributions determines the sign and the size of the 
region’s fiscal balance.
The study of the territorial influence of public sector actions, in gen-
eral, and of the fiscal balance, in particular, has a long history. In this respect 
Spain is no exception and, arguably, the Spanish region (or Autonomous 
Community, AC) with the longest tradition of calculating the fiscal balance 
with the central public sector 1 is Catalonia 2, which has a high fiscal deficit 
(reaching, in some years, 10% of the Catalan GDP). Unsurprisingly, this sub-
ject is a point of contention in Spanish public life, giving rise to considerable 
controversy, since it directly impacts people’s interests (that is, how high their 
tax bill is and what they receive in return) and affects patriotic feelings. How-
ever, it is evident that the question of inter-territorial fiscal flows affects not 
only Spain but it is a more general issue, as illustrated by recent controversies 
in Germany and by the difficulties in building a true federal European Union. 
The fiscal deficit has, inevitably, generated a sense of grievance among 
the Catalan people, who feel that the central government’s territorial redis-
tribution policy has a detrimental impact on Catalonia. In recent decades the 
Catalan government has tried to reduce this fiscal deficit by promoting vari-
ous reforms of the ACs’ financing system (Bosch and Durán, 2008; Bosch, 
2010a). Nevertheless, none of these reforms has substantially reduced the fis-
cal deficit with the central public sector. 
Various authors, most notably Spolaore (2010), Bolton and Roland 
(1997) and Alesina and Spolaore (2003), argue that inter-regional disagree-
ments over income-based redistribution may be sufficient to induce a coun-
try breakup. However, Catalan grievances are not only economic in nature, 
as separatists would also point to constant attacks made by the central gov-
ernment on their culture and language (Comisión de Economia Catalana 
del Colegio de Economistas de Cataluña, 2014) and to the lack of national 
recognition and real political autonomy. The demands and attempts to po-
litically structure the State in plurinational terms through a broad self-gov-
erning Generalitat (autonomous government of Catalonia) have never been 
accepted. This fact could justify the current levels of support among the Cat-
alans for secession from Spain. According to the Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió 3 
in June 2017 60% of the Catalan population considered that Catalonia had 
a low level of autonomy and 41.1% wanted an independent state. The con-
sequence is that 80% of Catalan population agrees to the proposal to hold a 
referendum on self-determination. 
The purpose of this article is to examine the fiscal flows produced by 
the actions of the Spanish central public sector concerning Catalonia and 
1 The general government sector is subdivided into four subsectors: central government, 
state government, local government, and social security funds. In this paper the concept «cen-
tral public sector» includes two subsectors: central government and social security funds. 
2 Spain has three levels of government: central, intermediate (formed by 17 ACs) and lo-
cal (municipalities and provinces). 
3 The Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió is a body of the autonomous government of Catalonia 
that carries out electoral studies and opinion surveys. 
their main determinants. In doing so, the article examines, first, whether the 
methodology used to compute fiscal flows in Catalonia meets international 
standards; second, whether the Catalan fiscal deficit is indeed among the 
largest in an international comparison; third, which are its main determi-
nants. Finally, we discuss whether the fiscal deficit issue can justify, at least 
partially, the current secessionist process of Catalonia.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we ex-
amine the methods used to compute fiscal balances in Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, the USA, Spain, and Italy, and assess their outcomes. In section 3 
we analyse the Catalan fiscal deficit from 1986 to 2012. The specific objec-
tives of these two sections are: a) to discuss the evolution of Catalan fiscal 
flows and their different estimates, b) to compare the size of the Catalan fis-
cal deficit with the results for regions in other countries, and c) to analyse 
the determinants of the Catalan fiscal deficit. Finally, we present our conclu-
sions in section 4.
2. Comparing fiscal flows in different countries
In this section we carry out a comparative study of fiscal balances in dif-
ferent countries. Specifically, we refer to five countries: Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Spain and the USA; we also examine the case of Italy, although the 
results are not completely comparable due to the computation of a net fiscal 
flow referred to all layers of government. Before comparing these countries, 
we briefly discuss the different methodologies that current literature pro-
poses to estimate fiscal balances. 
2.1. Methodological approaches to the allocation of revenues and expenditure 
Fiscal flows are generally computed considering Central government rev-
enues and expenditures. The main approaches for analysing the territorial 
distribution of central government revenues are the benefit approach and the 
flow approach (Bosch et al., 2010). The benefit approach allocates revenues 
to the territory where those who must eventually support the fiscal burden 
live. For example, VAT can be transferred to final consumers’ prices, which 
means that the tax burden falls on the final consumers. This effect is espe-
cially relevant when consumers and companies reside in different territories.
The flow approach allocates revenues to the territory in which the eco-
nomic capacity subject to taxation is located. For example, a company tax 
paid by a firm with fiscal residence in region A and, therefore, collected in 
region A, but with a factory in region B, will, according to this system, be al-
located to region B, which is where the taxable object is located.
In the case of the territorialization of Central government expenditure, 
spending is attributed to the territory in which the receiver of the benefit 
lives according to the benefit approach, independently of where the public 
service is produced or where the investment is made. In this instance, as-
sumptions have to be made about who the receivers are and what the ben-
efits are. 
In contrast, under the flow approach, expenditure is attributed to the 
territory where it is realized, irrespective of the geographical location of the 
final receivers of the benefits. As such, expenditure is attributed to where 
employees, the use of current goods and services, the receipt of transfers and 
the making of investments are located. This means that a conscious decision 
has been taken to endow the monetary flow with a «real» sense as opposed 
to considering it simply as «cash flow», which would result in public expen-
diture being attributed to the region in which the administration makes the 
payment. In the case of the remuneration of employees, the two approaches 
to monetary flows coincide; however, the results can vary greatly in the case 
of the other budgetary items. Thus, purchases of current goods and ser-
vices are attributed to the territory in which they are used, not to the region 
where they were acquired; investments in the region in which they materi-
alise; and transfers to the region where their final receivers reside.
In some studies, the flow approach is referred to as the «cash flow» ap-
proach, but in fact they only apply the «cash flow» method in the case of 
the remuneration of employees. Indeed, the assignment of public expendi-
ture according to the flow approach can be relatively simple, as long as there 
exists a system of public accounts that allows all items of expenditure to be 
attributed to a region.
The above discussion begs the following question: What, therefore, is 
the best methodology to use to calculate a fiscal balance? The answer would 
seem to depend on the motives underpinning the estimation of the fiscal bal-
ance in the first place. If the aim is to measure the effects of central public 
sector actions on the welfare of people living in a given territory, the best 
approach would be the benefit method. The measurement of these effects is 
made in terms of the «equivalent» change in the disposable income of indi-
viduals. However, the flow approach would be more appropriate if the aim 
is to measure the economic impact that central public sector actions have on 
a specific territory, that is, determining the impact on production, consump-
tion, public revenues and payments located in the territory (Bosch, 2010b). 
2.2. Countries case studies: Methodology and results
It is necessary to point out that comparative analysis between countries 
should be treated with caution because of differences in the distribution of 
tax powers and responsibilities across levels of government (Montasell Piñol 
and Sánchez Rata, 2012). There are also differences in the methodologies 
applied. For example, Australia only applies the flow approach. Belgium, 
Canada and the USA combine the flow and benefit approaches. Spain esti-
mates the fiscal balances using both methods. Finally, Italy uses the benefit 
approach. 
Referring to the institutional environment, all the studies considered here 
include the fiscal flows between central public administrations and the ter-
ritories of the federal states (Australia, Belgium, Canada and the USA) or the 
ACs (Spain). That is to say, the fiscal balance of each territory is the differ-
ence between the expenditure that central public administration (including 
social security) makes in a territory and the revenue paid by the same terri-
tory to the central administration. In the case of Italy, instead, the fiscal bal-
ance is the difference between what the residents of a region get from all lev-
els of government (central, local and social security) and what they pay. This 
estimation responds more to the concept of «fiscal residuum». 
As for the operations considered, the studies analysed exclude financial 
operations, that is, those carried out because of variations in financial assets 
and liabilities. Some studies include interest paid on debt while others do 
not.
Another relevant issue of fiscal balance estimations is the treatment of 
budget deficit or surplus. To analyse the outcomes arising from the fiscal 
balances of the different territories with the central government, its budget 
must be balanced. If this were not the case, the presence of either a surplus 
or deficit would influence the size of the fiscal balance. For example, if the 
central government budget deficit is very high, it might be the case that all 
the territories have a fiscal surplus. A central budget deficit/surplus causes 
a general improvement/deterioration in all the balances. For this reason, in 
order to analyse the redistributive effects of fiscal flows, the sum of the fiscal 
balances must be zero, and that is only possible when the central budget is 
balanced.
This correction is also necessary to compare the evolution of outcomes 
over time, as the financial situation of the central administration can differ 
from year to year and, as a consequence, variations might be introduced into 
the measurement of the fiscal balance.
Here, the studies of fiscal balances that we examine «neutralise» the 
central budgets. Technically, this can be achieved in one of three ways: a) 
through revenues: in the case of deficit (or surplus), the budget is balanced 
by increasing (or reducing) revenues until they are equal to expenditure by 
adding (or deducting) the amount of the budget deficit (or surplus) in the 
different territories according to the pattern resulting from the territorial dis-
tribution of revenues; b) through expenditure: in the case of deficit (or sur-
plus), the budget is balanced by reducing (or increasing) expenditure until 
it is equal to revenue, deducting (or adding) the budget deficit (or surplus) 
from (or to) the different territories according to the pattern resulting from 
the territorial distribution of expenditure; c) through a combination of the 
above two methods. Having discussed these issues, we now turn to the anal-
ysis of countries case studies.
2.2.1. Australia
In the case of the Australian Federation, the Treasury Department of the 
State of Western Australia annually calculates the fiscal balances of the vari-
ous states and territories in the Federation with the federal public sector 4. 
The method used is the flow approach (Western Australian Treasury, 1999). 
All non-financial operations are computed, excluding only the fiscal 
flows with the rest of the world. Therefore, interest payments are accounted 
for, territorialising them according to population. 
A specific aspect of the calculation of Australian fiscal flows is the treat-
ment given to the revenues and expenditure of the Australian Capital Terri-
tory (ACT), which are distributed among the other territories according to 
population. 
The results are presented assuming a balanced budget for the Federation. 
In the event of a budget deficit, the balance is achieved by increasing the 
revenue of the Federation by 50% of the deficit, with an allocation among 
the states according to the pattern of the territorial distribution of these rev-
enues, and reducing expenditure in the Federation by 50% of the deficit, 
with an allocation in accordance with the pattern of the territorial distribu-
tion of these expenditures.
Table 1 shows the results of the Australian State fiscal balances with the 
Federation in three fiscal years: 2006-2007, 2010-2011 and 2015-2016. In the 
most recent estimates, the states with a negative balance are Western Austra-
4 The fiscal balances of the states and territories with the federal public sector are pub-
lished annually in the documents accompanying the budget of Western Australia State (Bud-
get paper no 3: Economic and Fiscal Outlook).
lia (–8.52% of GDP), New South Wales (–0.87%) and Victoria (–0.35%). 
The states with a positive balance are Tasmania (21.63% of GDP), North 
Territory (19.64%), South Australia (9.18%) and Queensland (2.58%). The 
states with the highest GDP per capita (Western Australia and New South 
Wales) have a negative fiscal balance, that is, they are contributors, with the 
exception of the North Territory, which has the second highest GDP per 
capita but a positive fiscal balance. This reflects the specific characteristics of 
this territory. The region produces oil and gas, but its population represents 
just 1.02% of the total population of Australia, a feature that increases the 
cost of providing public services. 
Table 1 also shows that the state of Western Australia has seen a very 
high increase in its fiscal deficit in the last ten years, from –3.71% of GDP 
in 2006-2007 to –8.52% in 2015-2016. This fact could be explained by the 
increase of its GDP per capita, from 26.79% above the average in 2006-2007 
to 41.58% in 2015-2016. 
2.2.2. Belgium
In Belgium the Flemish government calculates the fiscal balances of the 
Belgian territories (ABAFIM, 2004; Van Rompuy, 2010). The methodology 
used combines the flow and benefit approaches. For example, the salaries 
of public employees are allocated to the region of their residence, a criterion 






















Western Australia –3.71 126.79 –7.54 131.53 –8.52 141.58
Northern Territory 15.50 125.05 21.09 125.66 19.64 140.20
Australian Capital 
Territory 137.82 140.12 132.78
New South Wales –1.30 100.63 –0.46 100.48 –0.87  99.85
Queensland 0.75  95.75 2.21  92.50 2.58  94.28
Victoria 0.10  95.25 0.39  94.20 –0.35  89.40
South Australia 5.36  84.37 5.41 88.60 9.18  86.20
Tasmania 10.73 76.60 13.61 76.56 21.63  72.83
Note: (*) The fiscal year in Australia begins on July 1 and ends on June 30.
Source: Government of Western Australia, Economic and Fiscal Outlook, Budget Paper No. 3, se-
veral years (2008-09, 2012-13, 2017-18) and Australian National Accounts, several years.
Tab. 2. Fiscal balances of Belgian regions with the central public sector, 2005
As % GDP
Per capita GDP index 
(Belgium = 100)
Brussels-Capital Region  2.70 201.49
Flanders –4.40  99.03
Wallonia 8.40  71.83
Source: Van Rompuy (2010). OECD. StatExtracts Database (on line), 2017, <http://stats.oecd.org> 
[consultation 30 Jan 2017].
that corresponds to the flow approach. In contrast, the purchase of current 
goods and services is territorialised according to GDP, which is more in line 
with the benefit approach.
Payments of interest on debt are excluded. The fiscal results are pre-
sented with the central budget balanced through, in the event of public defi-
cit, the equalization of revenues to expenditure.
Table 2 shows the fiscal balances of the three Belgian regions. In the 
case of the Brussels-Capital region, we observe that despite being the region 
with the highest GDP per capita, its fiscal balance is nevertheless positive 
(2.70% of GDP). This reflects its low fiscal capacity, attributable to a large 
immigrant population with low incomes and the emigration of higher-income 
population towards the other regions. 
In contrast, Flanders, with a GDP per capita around the average, has a 
negative fiscal balance (–4.40% of GDP) and Wallonia, the poorest region, 
has a positive fiscal balance (8.40% of GDP). 
2.2.3. Canada
Ruggeri (2010) provides the fiscal balances of the Canadian provinces. 
Revenues are territorialised according to the benefit approach; in other 
words, the person who supports the burden of taxes is sought.
Allocation of expenditures follows the flow approach, with the exception 
of the territorialization of expenditure on goods and services. These are not 
allocated to the territory where they are consumed but rather to the terri-
tory in which they generate income, that is, where the goods and services are 
produced. Because of a lack of more detailed information, primary income is 
used as an indicator of the territorialization of this expenditure, which there-
fore excludes the public sector.
Fiscal flows with the rest of the world and the payment of interest on 
public debt are excluded.
The fiscal results are presented with the public budget balanced, neutral-
ised through revenue, in Table 3. Alberta and Ontario, the regions with the 
highest GDP per capita, present negative fiscal balances (–3.23 and –2.33% 
of GDP, respectively), but Saskatchewan, also with a GDP per capita above 
the average, has a positive fiscal balance (6.08% of GDP). In contrast, the 
regions with a GDP per capita below the average show positive fiscal bal-
ances, with the exception of British Columbia (–0.90% of GDP). 
2.2.4. The United States of America
The fiscal balances of the various states were calculated for the year 2005 
by the Tax Foundation (2007). Revenues were territorialised according to the 
benefit approach and expenditure, basically, according to the flow approach.
All operations were included with the exception of fiscal flows with the 
rest of the world, interest on debt and other expenditure on federal public 
organizations (agencies).
The results were computed under the assumption that the budget was 
balanced. As there was a deficit in 2005, the level of revenues was therefore 
raised until it was equal to expenditure. The deficit was territorialised ac-
cording to the pattern of territorial distribution of revenues.
Table 4 shows the fiscal balances of the States. In general, the ones with 
a GDP per capita above the average present a negative fiscal balance, and 
vice versa, but there are several exceptions. For example, Wyoming and Vir-
ginia, with an income above average, present a positive fiscal balance, while 
for Wisconsin and Oregon the opposite occurs. The largest negative fiscal 
Tab. 3. Fiscal balances of Canadian provinces with the central public sector, 2004
As % GDP





British Columbia –0.90 93.92
Newfoundland and Labrador 10.93 92.83
Quebec 2.12 86.30
Manitoba 7.76 83.83
Nova Scotia 9.98 78.65
New Brunswick 11.02 78.18
Prince Edward Island 15.72 71.60
Source: Ruggeri (2010). OECD. StatExtracts Database (on line), 2017, <http://stats.oecd.org>. [con-
sultation 30 Jan 2017]. 










District of Columbia 37.21 343.51 Pennsylvania 1.35 93.03
Delaware –2.85 164.49 Wisconsin –2.56 92.92
Alaska 10.70 140.92 Ohio 0.85 91.66
Connecticut –7.26 131.31 North Dakota 11.01 91.61
Wyoming 1.79 125.18 Oregon –1.24 91.43
New York –4.03 118.58 Florida –0.62 90.31
New Jersey –8.81 118.28 Kansas 2.13 89.95
Massachusetts –3.86 117.90 Tennessee 4.59 89.46
Nevada –6.75 111.86 Indiana 0.87 89.26
Virginia 9.15 111.19 Michigan –1.51 88.37
Colorado –3.44 109.32 Vermont 1.51 88.14
Minnesota –5.19 109.27 Missouri 5.49 87.99
California –4.19 109.05 Arizona 3.31 86.33
Illinois –4.87 104.57 Utah 1.09 85.46
Whasington –2.32 104.41 New Mexico 15.37 85.05
Hawaii 7.07 103.86 Oklahoma 6.07 81.84
Maryland 6.38 103.67 Maine 7.43 81.23
Texas –0.97 103.23 Kentucky 8.44 79.43
New Hampshire –6.36 98.58 Alabama 11.11 79.41
Lousiana 9.49 97.54 Idaho 3.58 78.31
Rhode Island 0.00 97.11 South Carolina 5.99 78.06
Nebraska 1.64 97.09 Montana 8.39 76.38
North Carolina 1.26 96.32 Arkansas 6.85 74.72
Georgia 0.16 94.72 West Virginia 13.12 70.33
South Dakota 8.44 94.37 Mississipi 16.62 65.72
Iowa 1.60 94.08        
Source: Tax Foundation (2007), Federal Taxes Paid vs. Federal Sending Received by State, 1981-2005 
[on line], Tax Foundation, 2007 <http://taxfoundation.org/tax-topics/federal-taxes-paid-vs-spending-recei-
ved-state> [consultation 30 Set 2017]. OECD. StatExtracts Database (on line), 2017, <http://stats.oecd. 
org> [consultation 30 Jan 2017]. 
balances occurs in New Jersey (–8.81% of GDP) and Connecticut (–7.26% 
of GDP), both adjacent to New York State. 
2.2.5. Spain
In 2008 the Spanish government calculated the fiscal balances of all ACs 
(Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 2008). The methodology used followed both 
the benefit and the flow approaches. The literature provides several studies 
on fiscal balances in Spain 5. 
5 For example, see Castells et al. (2000), Barberán and Uriel (2007), López-Casasnovas 
and Rosselló Villalonga (2014a, 2104b), de la Fuente (2014) and IEB (2014).
Considering the most recent study, De la Fuente et al. (2014) estimated 
the territorial redistribution of the 2011 central budget for each Autonomous 
Community on behalf of the Ministry of Public Finance. This analysis of the 
territorial redistribution continued to be estimated in 2012, 2013 and 2014 6. 
However, the methodology employed is quite distinct from that used with 
the fiscal balances examined in this paper. In our view, a fiscal balance only 
analyses the redistributive impact of the central public sector activity in a 
territory, but De la Fuente et al. (2014) carry out an exercise that that does 
not correspond to this concept. The principal difference comes from the fact 
that they build an extended central public sector to which they attribute all 
the taxes of the Spanish fiscal system (central, autonomous and local). They 
also suppose the existence of fiscal spillovers from the autonomous taxes 
among ACs, but they do not consider the influence of autonomous expen-
diture (spillover effects). We therefore conclude that this study should not 
strictly be classified as a fiscal balance study.
In the fiscal balances calculated by the Spanish government in 2008, the 
following operations were excluded: a) revenues and expenditures that in-
clude financial operations; b) property income and revenues from real estate 
investments; c) operations with the European Union (EU); d) current and 
capital consolidation transfers. However, interest payments were included. 
This represents a difference in terms of the procedure adopted in some of 
the international studies described above. These payments are territorialised 
according to population. Finally, the calculation was made without balancing 
the budget. 
Table 5 shows the results. Using the benefit approach, all ACs with an 
above average per capita GDP have a negative fiscal balance; however, the 
pattern changes when the flow approach is adopted. Regardless of the ap-
proach, Valencia presents a negative fiscal balance, even though it has a 
GDP per capita below the average. The same is true of Murcia when using 
the flow approach. 
The Spanish territory with the largest fiscal deficit is the Balearic Is-
lands (14.20% of GDP when applying the flow approach and 7.80% with 
the benefit approach). The second place is occupied by Catalonia, with a 
negative fiscal balance of 8.70% (flow) and 6.69% (benefit) of GDP. The 
community of Madrid has a largest fiscal deficit according to the benefit ap-
proach (9.08% of GDP), but occupies the fourth place when using the flow 
approach. 
6 See also Ministerio de Hacienda y Función Públicas (2017), where the same estimation 
is conducted for 2013 and 2014.
The cases of the Basque Country and Navarre are worth a note apart, 
since they enjoy a special status (Navarre is a Comunidad Foral, whereas 
three provinces in the Basque Country are Diputaciones Forales). These ACs 
present a high GDP per capita but relatively low negative fiscal balances 
compared to those recorded in the other wealthier ACs. This is due to the 
different system of financing applied in these two regions. According to this 
system, they levy all State taxes, but in return they just pay an annual quota 
for the public services provided by the State, as established by an agreement 
with the State. A controversial aspect of this system is that there is no effec-
tive mechanism of horizontal equalization between these ACs and the others. 
2.2.6. Italy
In Italy, the poor quality of available data implied so far few academic 
exercises about the regional redistribution of public funds. Here we refer 
to Ambrosanio et al. (2010). Basically, they use the benefit approach for the 
localization of expenditure. In regionalizing national taxes, they follow in 
general terms the flow approach. A national tax is attributed to the region 
where the economic transaction that creates the tax burden takes place. 
Tab. 5. Fiscal balances of the Spanish Autonomous Communities with the central public sector, 2005
Benefit approach Flow approach
As % GDP Per capita
GDP index
(Spain = 100)
As % GDP Per capita
GDP index
(Spain = 100)
Madrid –9.08 131.23 –5.57 131.23
Basque Country –0.70 127.60 –1.35 127.60
Navarre –2.37 126.29 –3.18 126.29
Catalonia –6.69 118.37 –8.70 118.37
Balearic Islands –7.80 112.15 –14.20 112.15
La Rioja –2.24 107.49 0.66 107.49
Aragon –1.15 107.00 1.83 107.00
Cantabria 2.30 98.27 5.03 98.27
Valencia –3.42 95.99 –6.32 95.99
Castile and Leon 4.11 94.67 7.57 94.67
Canary Islands 5.95 90.56 1.60 90.56
Ceuta and Melilla 6.51 90.25 31.02 90.25
Asturias 10.82 88.18 14.33 88.18
Murcia 0.67 83.79 –2.13 83.79
Galicia 6.87 81.29 8.19 81.29
Castile-La Mancha 5.43 78.80 3.54 78.80
Andalusia 3.81 77.71 4.53 77.71
Extremadura 15.21 67.83   17.78 67.83
Source: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (2008).
This study has some particular characteristics that make comparison dif-
ficult with the others mentioned above. Firstly, the fiscal balance is the dif-
ference between what the residents of a region receive from all government 
tiers (central, local and social security) and what they pay. The results ob-
tained represent the net fiscal balance of the residents of each region with 
the whole public sector. However, in the other studies analysed the fiscal 
balance of each territory is only the difference between the expenditure that 
central public administration (including social security) makes in a territory 
and the revenue paid by the territory to the central administration. That is 
to say, the fiscal relationship of the residents of a territory with the local gov-
ernment is omitted. Secondly, concerning data, Ambrosanio et al. (2010) only 
considers current revenues and current expenditures. So, on the expenditure 
side, they do not include capital payments. 
As in the cases of Belgium, Canada and the USA interest payments are 
excluded. The Italian study also balances the public budget. Since it elimi-
nates interest payments and capital expenditure, the result is a slight surplus 
in the current public budget. This surplus is then eliminated (subtracting it 
on a per capita basis from total revenue), by just assuming that it goes to fi-
nancing the expenditure not considered in the computation. 
Results are presented in Table 6. All the regions with a per capita GDP 
above the national average have a negative net fiscal balance, with three 
Tab. 6.  Net fiscal balances of the Italian regions, 2005. General government (central + local + social security)
As % GDP
Per capita GDP index 
(Italy = 100)
Valle d’Aosta 2.80 130.33
Lombardia –11.56 129.51

















Calabria 17.83   64.75
Source: Ambrosanio et al. (2010).
exceptions: Valle d’Aosta, the richest region with a GDP per capita index 
equal to 130.33 and a net fiscal balance of 2.80% of GDP; Liguria, char-
acterized by an index of 102.05 and a net fiscal balance of 5.57% of GDP; 
and Marche, with an index of 100.41 and a net fiscal balance of 0.60%. The 
other regions, with a GDP per capita below the national average, present a 
positive net fiscal balance. Among the regions with a negative fiscal balance, 
Lombardia stands out for its high fiscal deficit, –11.56% of GDP. Lombar-
dia, with a GDP per capita index of 129.51, is also one of the richest re-
gions together with Valle d’Aosta, but differently from Valle d’Aosta it does 
not enjoy a Special Statute. Hence, the situation in Valle d’Aosta reflects the 
same problems we discussed above with respect to Navarre and the Basque 
Country in Spain.
3. The fiscal balance of Catalonia: Results, evolution and determinants
3.1. Introduction to the Catalan case 
Catalonia has a long tradition of calculating the fiscal balance of its ter-
ritory with the central public sector. Unlike other territories of the Spanish 
State, quite a few academic studies have been produced in Catalonia over 
the years. The Catalan government has also promoted the estimation of fis-
cal balances, by both external and internal teams. The earliest data are from 
1986 and the most recent from 2012. 
The estimation of Catalan fiscal balances has always caused great con-
troversy about the territorial redistribution of the central public budget. As 
Table 5 shows, Catalonia is one of the ACs with a high fiscal deficit, a fact 
that has contributed to generate an historical claim for better fiscal treatment 
from both the citizens and the government of Catalonia. 
In 2005 the Catalan nationalist parties in the Spanish Parliament asked 
the government for an official estimation of the fiscal balances of all ACs. 
The government complied establishing a Commission of experts to estab-
lish the methodology for the estimation of the fiscal balances (Ministerio 
de Economía y Hacienda, 2006); the results of the estimation exercise were 
published in 2008 (Table 5). At present, the Ministry of Public Finance pe-
riodically estimates the territorial redistribution of the public budget, though 
with a methodology that, as mentioned above, it is closer to the one used in 
Italy to compute the «fiscal residuum».
It should be pointed out that the large Catalan contribution has not 
caused any convergence in growth rates among the Spanish regions. Table 
7 shows the per capita GDP index in two years: 2000 and 2016. Despite the 
considerable territorial redistribution of the Spanish budget there has been 
no regional convergence in these 16 years. In 2000 the standard deviation of 
the GDP per capita index was 20.42 and in 2016, it was 20.61. This is one 
of the main criticisms levelled by the Catalan government against the territo-
rial policy of the central government. 
Indeed, Bosch et al. (2002, 2003) have demonstrated empirically that 
Spain is one of the countries in which the redistributive power of the central 
government budget is greater even compared with countries that are actu-
ally federal states, most notably Australia, Canada, the USA, and even the 
European Union. This redistributive power is primarily associated with ex-
penditure more than it is with revenue and, specifically, with the system of 
financing the ACs.
3.2. Methodology
In this section we analyse the fiscal balances estimated by the Catalan 
government itself between 1986 and 2012. The methodology employed fol-
lows both the benefit and the flow approaches. During this period there 
have been methodological changes in the calculation of the fiscal balances 
aimed at enhancing the procedure and bringing it more closely in line with 
Tab. 7. Per capita GDP index (Spain = 100)
Autonomous Communities and cities 2000 2016
Madrid 133.88 136.52




La Rioja 111.79 107.18
Balearic Islands 125.70 103.75





Canary Islands 97.71 82.88
Ceuta 90.05 81.13
Murcia 83.64 80.98




Total National 100.00 100.00
Standard deviation 20.42 20.61
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), (Spanish Statistical Office).
the international canons presented above (Colldeforns, 1991; Martínez, 1997; 
López-Casasnovas and Martínez, 2000; Generalitat de Catalunya, 2009, 2012, 
2013, 2014, 2016). 
The institutional sector covered by Catalonia’s fiscal balances includes 
the State, autonomous organizations, state agencies and other public organi-
zations, the Social Security, the public companies that form part of the cen-
tral administration sector according to the terms of the European System of 
Accounts (ESA), and other public companies that contribute to significantly 
increasing the stock of public capital, such as ADIF (railway infrastructures), 
the State Property Administration Company, water companies depending on 
the Ministry of the Environment, AENA (airports) and the State Ports.
As regards the operations considered, there are no substantial differ-
ences from those included in the methodology used by the Spanish govern-
ment in 2008, but for the fiscal results of Catalonia’s fiscal balance with the 
central public sector computed with the central budget balanced or «neu-
tralised». This is achieved using the revenues method: in the event of deficit 
(or surplus), the budget is balanced increasing (or reducing) revenues until 
they match expenditures, adding (or deducting) the amount of the budgetary 
deficit (or surplus) to revenues according to the pattern resulting from their 
territorial distribution.
As mentioned, Catalonia has a long tradition of calculating its fiscal bal-
ance with the central public sector. In the case of calculations based on the 
flow approach, a methodologically homogenous time series is available from 
1986 to 2012. In contrast, in the case of calculations based on the benefit 
approach, homogenous data only cover the period 2001-2012. Other stud-
ies have calculated the balance applying the criteria of the benefit approach, 
but as they present other significant methodological differences it was not 
considered appropriate to include them in the series examined in this article. 
When analysing Catalonia’s fiscal balance from a historical perspective, 
one specific technical issue needs to be borne in mind. While not detracting 
in any way from the results obtained, the various studies calculating the re-
gion’s fiscal balance have incorporated a number of methodological changes, 
such as the inclusion of investments by public companies or the allocation of 
interest payments.
3.3. Analysis of the results and evolution
Table 8 presents the evolution of Catalonia’s fiscal balance from 1986 
to 2012, according to the flow approach. The neutralised fiscal balance is 
shown (in million of euros and as a percentage of Catalan GDP), according 
to the criteria of equalising revenue to expenditure. In this way, the effects of 
variations in the financial situation of the central public sector are cancelled 
out and a comparison over time is feasible.
The results show that Catalonia has always presented a fiscal deficit with 
the central public sector, which is to be expected of a region with an econ-
omy stronger than the average. Moreover, it is only logical that there should 
be a redistribution in favour of the less prosperous communities. However, 
the problem is not so much the sign of the fiscal result, but its magnitude. 
According to the flow approach, Catalonia presents an average fiscal deficit 
for the period 1986-2012 of 8.0% of regional GDP. Furthermore, the deficit 
has been slightly higher (more negative) during the last decade than in previ-
ous years. Having said that, the deficit has remained remarkably stable over 
the period, oscillating between 6.7 and 10.1% of regional GDP, in spite of 
all the changes that have occurred during the last 27 years.
As mentioned above, these results are obtained applying the criteria of 
a balanced budget, because they allow an analysis to be made of the terri-
Tab. 8. Neutralised Fiscal Balance of Catalonia with the central public sector. Flow approach





























Standard deviation   0.9
Source: Generalitat de Catalunya (2016).
Tab. 9. Neutralised Fiscal Balance of Catalonia with the central public sector. Flow approach
Neutralised Non-Neutralised
Million of € % Catalonia GDP Million of € % Catalonia GDP
1986 –2,465 6.8   –2,724 –7.4
1987 –2,868 –7.0 –3,269 –7.9
1988 –3,466 –7.5 –3,357 –7.2
1989 –4,056 –7.7 –4,641 –8.7
1990 –4,867 –8.3 –5,129 –8.6
1991 –5,174 –8.0 –5,615 –8.6
1992 –5,988 –8.6 –5,028 –7.1
1993 –7,263 –10.1 –3,046 –4.2
1994 –6,732 –8.8 –4,485 –5.8
1995 –6,416 –7.7 –4,575 –5.4
1996 –7,088 –7.9 –5,500 –6.1
1997 –7,018 –7.4 –7,619 –7.9
1998 –6,813 –6.8 –7,725 –7.6
1999 –8,124 –7.5 –9,524 –8.7
2000 –8,532 –7.2 –10,972 –9.2
2001 –8,565 –6.7 –11,307 –8.8
2002 –13,696 –10.1 –12,674 –9.2
2003 –13,036 –8.9 –12,472 –8.5
2004 –13,595 –8.7 –13,448 –8.5
2005 –14,186 –8.4 –16,735 –9.8
2006 –14,493 –7.9 –18,979 –10.3
2007 –15,913 –8.1 –21,162 –10.7
2008 –17,200 –8.6 –11,576 –5.7
2009 –16,409 –8.5 –791 –0.4
2010 –16,543 –8.5 –5,385 –3.0
2011 –15,006 –7.7 –7,822 –4.0
2012 –14,623 –7.5 –7,573 –3.9
Average   –8.0     –7.2
Standard deviation 0.9     2.4
Source: Generalitat de Catalunya: Metodologia i càlcul de la balança fiscal de Catalunya amb el sec-
tor públic central, Barcelona, Departament de la Viceprsidència i d’Economia i Hisenda, several years.
torial redistribution attributable to the actions of the central administration. 
This corresponds to a territorial redistribution with a zero sum; i.e., what is 
gained by some communities is contributed by the others. Recall that to vi-
sualise the flows between territories correctly, a balanced budget for the cen-
tral public sector has to be assumed. Therefore, the sum of all the balances 
is zero and the negative differences reflect contributions to territorial cohe-
sion, while the positive differences indicate the receipt of resources. 
Table 9 compares the previous neutralised results for the economic cycle 
with the non-neutralised outcomes. It can be seen that the latter variations 
in the balances are much greater and that the range of values is much wider. 
However, given that in the medium term the public sector has to have 
a balanced budget, the average for the two series over the period is similar: 
in the case of the non-neutralised fiscal balance it stands at 7.2% of GDP, 
while with the neutralised balance it stands at 8% of GDP. We can there-
fore deduce that the State budget balance introduces variability into the time 
series in the case of the non-neutralised fiscal balance, but it does not seem 
to have any significant effect on the average level of this balance across the 
cycle.
Taking this evidence into account, we can conclude that the average fis-
cal balance across the economic cycle (both in the neutralised and non-neu-
tralised cases) is a reasonable measure of the structural level of imbalance in 
the flows of revenue and expenditure between the central administration and 
Catalonia. Similarly, given the lower variability presented by the neutralised 
series, we can conclude that, in any year, the structural level of the fiscal bal-
ance is better proxied by neutralising the public deficit of the central govern-
ment.
In a situation of public deficit (surplus), the neutralised fiscal balance 
presents a higher (lower) deficit, compared to the initial result. As a result, 
in recent years, due to the economic crisis, which has meant a high level of 
deficit in the central public sector, Catalonia’s non-neutralised fiscal deficit 
has been reduced significantly. However, the fiscal balance without neutral-
ization gives a false image of the flows of territorial cohesion. For example, 
compare this with the fact that the difference between the percentage of rev-
enue contributed by Catalonia and the percentage of expenditure it receives 
has remained unchanged.
Table 10 specifically shows the percentage represented by the revenue 
extracted from Catalonia by the central public sector and compares this with 
the percentage of expenditure allocated to the region in the period 1986-
2012. Catalonia contributed, on average, around 19.4% of the revenues of 
the central and the social security administrations. These same administra-
tions allocated an average of 14% of their expenditure to Catalonia. In fact, 
the central public sector extracts a percentage from Catalonia that corre-
sponds to its weight in the Spanish GDP, but allocates expenditure accord-
ing to a percentage below its weight in the population (16%).
In the case of the benefit approach, the results in Table 11 show that 
during the period 2001-2012 Catalonia had an average fiscal deficit of 
6.0%of GDP. The difference with the result obtained when applying the 
flow approach criteria is unsurprising, given that there are major areas of 
expenditure for which the distribution according to one or other approach 
differ significantly. However, the results obtained from the benefit approach 
do not vary greatly. Here again, this should be expected if we bear in mind, 
for example, that in the case of public goods, one of the most frequently 
used criteria for distributing expenditure is a highly structural variable such 
as population.
The Catalan fiscal deficit does not therefore vary very much over time, 
whether it is calculated via an approach or another. This fact represents a 
big drag for the Catalan economy. 
If the dimensions of the Catalan deficit are compared with those of the 
net contributor regions of the countries analysed in Section 3, we see that, 
with the exception of Western Australia State and the two states adjacent to 
New York State (New Jersey and Connecticut), no region presents a fiscal 
deficit in the order of 8% of annual GDP according to the flow approach. 
Nevertheless, in the case of Western Australia (with a fiscal deficit of 8.52% 
of GDP in 2015-2016) we can see that this state is much richer than Catalo-
nia within the country (its GDP per capita is 40% above the federal average, 
Table 1), while Catalonia only is 19% above the national average (Table 7). 
The case of Lombardia, with a net fiscal balance of 11.56% of GDP, de-
serves a separate mention. As discussed above, this result is not comparable 
with the others due to the different institutional environment. In addition, 
Tab. 10.  Participation of Catalonia in the revenues and expenditure of central public sector. Flow approach
 
% of the total of the autonomous communities





























Standard deviation 0.4 0.5
Source: See Table 8.
Lombardia is also one of the richest regions of Italy, with a GDP per capita 
almost 30% above the national average, that is, in a better position than Cat-
alonia within the country (Table 6). 
A further conclusion to be drawn from the comparative analysis is that 
the magnitude of the Catalan fiscal deficit is huge in relation to the ranking 
in terms of GDP within the country and is persistent over time. From the 
analysis carried out, we cannot draw conclusions about the degree to which 
this factor has caused the separatist movement, but there are two issues to 
point out. The first is the very different fiscal treatment of Catalonia and the 
Basque Country and Navarre. Both ACs are richer than Catalonia, but they 
have a very low fiscal deficit (Table 5). This factor has contributed to pro-
duce a feeling of grievance in Catalonia. The second issue to highlight is that 
there are many other factors which have also contributed towards creating 
the secessionist movement, such as the lack of a national recognition for Cat-






Million of € % Catalonia GDP Million of € % Catalonia GDP
1986 –2,465 –6.8      
1987 –2,868 –7.0      
1988 –3,466 –7.5      
1989 –4,056 –7.7      
1990 –4,867 –8.3      
1991 –5,174 –8.0      
1992 –5,988 –8.6      
1993 –7,263 –10.1      
1994 –6,732 –8.8      
1995 –6,416 –7.7      
1996 –7,088 –7.9      
1997 –7,018 –7.4      
1998 –6,813 –6.8      
1999 –8,124 –7.5      
2000 –8,532 –7.2      
2001 –8,565 –6.7   –7,526 –6.1
2002 –13,696 –10.1   –10,225 –7.4
2003 –13,036 –8.9   –9,586 –6.5
2004 –13,595 –8.7   –10,123 –6.4
2005 –14,186 –8.4   –10,141 –6.0
2006 –14,493 –7.9   –10,320 –5.6
2007 –15,913 –8.1   –11,136 –5.6
2008 –17,200 –8.6   –11,860 –5.9
2009 –16,409 –8.5   –11,475 –5.9
2010 –16,543 –8.5   –11,258 –5.8
2011 –15,006 –7.7   –11,087 –5.7
2012 –14,623 –7.5   –10,030 –5.1
Average   –8.0     –6.0
Standard deviation   0.9     0.6
Source: See Table 8.
alonia, the absence of a real political autonomy and the actions of the Span-
ish central government against its language and culture. 
3.4 Determinants of Catalonia’s fiscal deficit
A question that immediately arises when analysing a region’s fiscal bal-
ance concerns just what the drivers of the result are. To provide an answer 
we first present the results of the fiscal balance without Social Security, given 
that in this regard the central government has virtually no say in where to 
allocate the expenditure, as it is a non-discretionary payment related to an 
interpersonal redistribution performed by the government owing to people’s 
acquired rights. These include both social and unemployment benefits that 
are financed, mainly, through contributions to the Social Security and its au-
tonomous organizations 7. 
In contrast, investment expenditure, made by the government, its au-
tonomous organizations and its public companies, is much more optional 
in nature. The government has greater discretionary powers when deciding 
the level, composition and the territorial allocation of this item. A separate 
study of these policies provides a clearer vision of the financial relationship 
between Catalonia and the central administration.
In Table 12 we repeat the previous exercise, but this time we exclude the 
revenues and expenditure that belong to the Administration of the Social Se-
curity. Thus, we exclude the main items of interpersonal redistribution that 
are, likewise, of a markedly administrative nature. These items are character-
ised by a very low degree of discretion, since social security contributions are 
made on condition of the payment of the benefits which this entity manages 
(retirement, disability and widows pensions, unemployment benefit, etc.) that 
cannot be redirected. For all other policies, the central government enjoys 
many more options.
The results highlight a greater fiscal deficit as the State administration 
and its organizations obtain 19.6% of their total revenues from Catalonia, 
but only allocate 11.0% of their, largely discretionary, expenditure (i.e., the 
autonomous finance system, infrastructure investment policy, etc.) to this AC. 
As a consequence, the difference between what Catalonia contributes 
and receives is equivalent to 40% of the resources extracted. It should be 
borne in mind, however, that part of this difference is due to the treatment 
of health expenditure. Between 1986 and 1994, health expenditure was man-
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aged by the Social Security, whereas, between 1995 and 2001, it was in-
cluded as central administration expenditure. However, since 2002, following 
the devolution of responsibilities in this area to the ACs, health expenditure 
has formed part of the ACs’ budget. 
For this reason, it is apparent that one of the conclusions that can be 
drawn is that Catalonia’s fiscal balance depends to a great extent on policies 
over which the central government has greater decision-making powers.
Note that the discrepancy between the weights of Catalonia’s contributed 
revenue and allocated expenditure remains stable, regardless of the size of 
the central government’s budget surplus or deficit. These percentages high-
light the imbalance that exists independently of whether the surplus/deficit is 
neutralised or not. As highlighted before, neutralisation is only relevant when 
reporting the fiscal deficit in absolute figures, but is unnecessary when the 
imbalance is reported as a percentage of revenue contributed and expendi-
ture received.
Tab. 12.  Participation of Catalonia in the revenues and expenditure of central public sector (excluding Social 
Security). Flow approach
 
% of the total of the autonomous communities
% revenues % expenditures difference difference/revenues
1986 19.1 10.3 8.8 0.5
1987 19.1 10.6 8.5 0.4
1988 19.1 10.6 8.4 0.4
1989 19.3 10.8 8.5 0.4
1990 19.4 10.6 8.8 0.5
1991 19.6 10.4 9.1 0.5
1992 19.8 10.8 9.0 0.5
1993 19.8 10.4 9.4 0.5
1994 19.8 10.2 9.6 0.5
1995 20.1 13.0 7.1 0.4
1996 20.4 12.9 7.5 0.4
1997 20.8 13.4 7.4 0.4
1998 19.9 13.6 6.3 0.3
1999 19.9 12.5 7.5 0.4
2000 19.9 12.6 7.2 0.4
2001 19.8 13.0 6.8 0.3
2002 20.0 9.7 10.3 0.5
2003 19.9 10.3 9.6 0.5
2004 19.7 9.8 9.9 0.5
2005 19.9 9.8 10.1 0.5
2006 19.8 10.5 9.4 0.5
2007 19.7 10.3 9.4 0.5
2008 19.4 10.5 8.9 0.5
2009 19.3 11.4 7.9 0.4
2010 19.5 11.3 8.2 0.4
2011 19.5 9.4 10.1 0.5
2012 17.8 9.1 8.7 0.5
Average 19.6 11.0 8.6 0.4
Source: See Table 8.
This distribution of expenditure is particularly unfavourable for Catalo-
nia in terms of the spending of the State (including the model for financing 
the ACs), the autonomous organizations and public bodies. However, this is 
partially offset by the expenditure of the Social Security.
Indeed, the system of financing the Autonomies determines, to a great 
extent, Catalonia’s fiscal balance. These results present a markedly structural 
nature and coincide with the results reported by Espasa and Bosch (2010) in 
which the determinants of the fiscal balance with the central administration 
were estimated for all the ACs.
To calculate the main determinants of Catalonia’s fiscal deficit, we em-
ployed the following methodology. First, State expenditure in Catalonia was 
broken down into the following components: infrastructure (roads and rail-
ways), defence, interest payments, Autonomous Community financing, and 
other expenditures (all the rest) 8. Second, the theoretical fiscal balance was 
calculated for each component of expenditure. This is the difference be-
tween the expenditure on one specific budget component in Catalonia and 
the estimated revenues used to finance it, the latter being the product of to-
tal expenditure on this component in the State as a whole and the relative 
weight of the revenue contributed by Catalonia in relation to the central ad-
ministration’s total revenue.
This can be expressed as:
(1) SFi,m = Ei,m – Et,m (Ti/Tt)
where SF is the fiscal balance, E expenditure, T is the revenue contributed, 
i represents Catalonia, m the component of expenditure analysed, and t the 
total for the State.
Table 13 shows the components of expenditure that determine the fiscal 
deficit as measured for the period 2006-2012. It can be seen that the financ-
ing of the ACs accounts for 32 or 44% of the fiscal deficit, depending on 
whether we adopt the flow or benefit approaches, respectively. As such, the 
model of financing the autonomous community of Catalonia is one of the 
main causes of the fiscal deficit faced by Catalonia.
Successive reforms of the system of autonomous financing have been 
inspired by the notion that communities such as Catalonia are treated un-
favourably and that steps were required to improve the situation. Yet, it is 
8 The weight of each component, as a percentage of the total, is as follows: infrastructure 
(roads and railways) 3%; defence 8%; interest payments on public debt 24%; autonomous 
community financing 29%; other expenditures (all the rest) 36%.
evident that none of these reforms have rectified these imbalances (Bosch, 
2011; De la Fuente, 2012). Likewise, it has been demonstrated that the in-
vestment policies implemented by successive central governments have 
promoted a model that is extremely radial in nature, aimed at rebalancing 
Spain’s territories. This has meant that investment has been largely directed 
towards the less developed ACs (De la Fuente, 2004; Castells and Solé-Ollé, 
2005; Díaz and Martínez, 2006; Espasa, 2009; Bel, 2010).
TABLE 13 
4. Conclusions
The purpose of this article has been to examine the fiscal flows produced
by the actions of the Spanish central public sector concerning Catalonia and 
their main determinants. In doing so, we compare the Catalan fiscal deficit 
with that of rich territories of other countries. This analysis allows to exam-
ine, on the one hand, whether the methodology used in Catalan fiscal bal-
ances in general terms meets international standards and, on the other hand, 
whether the Catalan fiscal deficit is indeed among the largest in the sample 
of territories analysed, thus possibly justifying the current feeling of griev-
ance among the Catalan people and the secessionist movement. 
The analysis reported herein shows that the methodology for calculating 
fiscal balances is fairly standardized at the international level. This is evident 
as regards both the respective approaches adopted (flow approach or benefit 
approach) as well as in relation to some critical measurement issues in this 
field. The studies examined include Social Security within the institutional 
framework for analysis and also coincide in the fact they do not consider fi-
nancial operations. However, there is considerable discrepancy with regard 
to the inclusion in the calculation of the interest payments on central govern-
ment’s debt. Another aspect on which the studies are in full agreement is 
the need to neutralise the budgetary surplus or deficit in order to be able to 
analyse the redistributive effects of the fiscal flows generated by central gov-
ernment. This neutralization is carried out mainly via the revenue channel.
The studies carried out in Catalonia over a period of many years follow 
almost the same methodological guidelines. The results of these calculations 
indicate that Catalonia has always had a pretty stable fiscal deficit with the 
central public sector. The results also show that the magnitude of the Cata-
lan deficit, when applying standard normative frameworks, is high in com-
parison to those found in other regions of some advanced countries. We can 
find some other territories with a similar deficit, but comparatively richer 
than Catalonia or with special characteristics. 
When applying the flow approach, Catalonia reports an average fiscal 
deficit between 1986 and 2012 of 8% of regional GDP and this figure has 
been a little higher (more negative) during the last decade than in previous 
years. This is a direct consequence of the fact that Catalonia has contributed, 
on average, around 19.4% of central administration and Social Security rev-
enues while these administrations have allocated to Catalonia an average of 
14% of their expenditure. If the revenues and the expenditures that belong 
to the Administration of the Social Security are excluded, we find that Cata-
lonia has contributed around 19.6% of central revenues but received only 
11% of central expenditure. The distribution of expenditure is therefore 
particularly unfavourable for Catalonia, in terms of Spanish State spending, 
though there is a partial offsetting by Social Security spending. 
Catalonia presented an average fiscal deficit of around 6.0% of GDP 
during the period 2001-2012 when applying the benefit approach.
These results are a consequence of the high level of redistributive power 
of the central government’s budget in relation to those of other federal coun-
tries, this power being centred very directly on Spain’s system of financing 
the ACs. Indeed, our results show that when Social Security is excluded on 
the grounds of its non-discretionary character, the difference between the 
percentage of revenue contributed and expenditure received widens. This in-
dicates that it is the more discretionary elements of central government ex-
penditure, particularly the system of financing the Autonomies, which are 
the main determinants of this fiscal deficit.
Finally, further research, in line with the contributions of Alesina and 
Spolaore (2003) and Spolaore (2010), is called for to test whether the Cat-
alan fiscal deficit might partly explain the increase in separatist feelings 
among its population. It probably is an important factor, but Catalan griev-
ances are not only economic in nature. Other factors surely have more rel-
evance, such as the constant attacks made by the Spanish central government 
on the culture and language and the lack of national recognition and real 
political autonomy. To resolve these Catalan aspirations for self-government 
a new Statute of Autonomy was approved by referendum in 2006. Neverthe-
less, the binding nature of the entire document was removed by the State in 
a ruling handed down by the Spanish Constitutional Court in 2010. This was 
seen by many Catalans to be a proof that the autonomous model set out in 
the Constitution of 1978 was no longer applicable and it was also the trigger 
for the great increase of secessionism in Catalonia, that is to say the search 
for new solutions to the problem implied by a huge increase in the number 
of citizens prepared to break away from Spain. 
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